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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
OLIVE H. PRESTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,.
- vs. -

Case No.
11001

GEORGE P. LAMB and T. J. SPEROS,
Defendants - Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellant seeks to recover damages for personal
injnrit>s which she sustained when she fell on the floor
of tlw ddendants' business which she claims was due
to nPgligence of the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'l1he lower court granted the defendants' Motion for
Snmmar~T .Judgment and entered judgment for the def Pnclants.

2
RF~LIEF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant claims that the lffwer court erred in grant
ing the Summary Judgment, that there are triable issues
of fact, and that the Summary Judgment should be
reverst>d lwrmitting a trial of the case on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The dt>f endants are the owners and operators of
Lamb's Grill, which is located in the heart of the Salt
Lake City business district at 169 South Main Strret.
On December 24, the day before Christmas, the plaintiff, at approximately 11 :00 A.M. entered the defendants'
restaurant to get a cup of coffee. She claims that as a
result of the defendants' negligence, she slipped and fell
on their linoleum floor sustaining a broken left hip.
The plaintiff alleges in her amended complaint that
the "defendants were negligent in the manner and procedure of waxing and care of the floor of (their) business, in applying excessive amounts of wax, and in
maintaining a highly waxed, buffed and polished floor ·
which was unusually slippery, unsafe, and dangerous to
persons walking upon the same; and, in addition, that
the defendants wne negligent in that said floor was ,
maintained without any runner, carpet, wipe-up mat,
or other floor covPring on a snowy, rainy, wet day, or
without providing any means of protection to persons
walking on said floor." (See amended Complaint, R.
22-23)
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At the time of the accident and for most of the
morning before the accident, it had been raining and
the sidewalks were wet (Deposition of Margaret Stoll,
Pag0 8, LinP 1). The plaintiff had walked from her place
of rmployment, Standard Optical, which is up the street
from Lambs Grill. Larry Hugentobler, also an employee
of Rtandard Optical, accompanied her. She was wearing
a pump type shoe with a medium heel and as she walked
to thP defendants' restaurant, the sidewalks were wet
and her fept also were wet as she entered (See Affidavit
of Olive H. Preston (R. 30).
The defendants were well aware of the disagreeable
weather on the day of the accident. At the time, no wipenp mats or any other type of floor covering were put
011t to protect people coming in from the wet pavement
onto the defendants' polished floor (See deposition of
Mr. Lamb, Page 19, Line 1-10).
With respect to the condition of the defendants'
floor at the time of the accident, the plaintiff testified
in her deposition at Page 14, Line 8 through Line 9
that Margaret, an employee of the defendants, stated
at the time of the accident, "That floor is awfully sliprwry, Olive. They waxed it last night."
Jerry Hugentobler, who accompanied her, described
tlw floor in his deposition at Page 8, Line 5 as: "It
was highly polished, it was clean."
Mr ..James H. Lee, at Page 43, Line 16-19 of his
drposition, states that the buffing of the floor nightly
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tak<>s all of tlw spots off and makes the floor shine and ·
look clean.
:Mr. J,Pe is the maintenance man employed by thP

<lPfendants and has responsibility for maintenance of
tht> floor of their restaurant. He dPscribes in his deposition at Page 3G, Line 25, through Page 40, Line 30, the
procedure for waxing and maintaining the floor of the
rnstaurant. The actual waxing of the floor was done
about the middle of August, four and one-half months
prior to the accident (See ans,ver to plaintiff's Interrogatories No. 7, R. 13). According to Mr. Lee the procedure for waxing consists of first stripping the floor
of all the old wax. This is done by mopping the floor
with a special detergent purchased from the Magic
Chemical Company in Salt Lake City. About two cups
of dett>rgent is used for 2-3 gallons of water. The floor
is rinsed after the mopping. After drying, it it waxed
with a wax called "Guard," also purchased from Magic
Chemical Company. The wax is applied with a wool
applicator. -when the wool applicator is absorbed with
wax, the practice is to wax an area of the floor of about
3-4 square feet. The floor is then allowed to dry. Some·
times, another coat is applied. After the wax has dried,
it is polished with a rotary electric polishing machine.
The day-to-day maintenance consists of sweeping
it with a pnslt broom or a dry untreated dust mop and
then huffing it with a rotary electric buffing machine
(See dPposi6on of .James H. Lee, Page 42, Line 12
through Page 43, Line 19). This had been done every
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,1a:1 after closing hours from the time of waxing to the
tilnP of injury.
Douglas MacGrPgor, a mechanical engineer,
was rPtained by the plaintiff to determine the degree
of slipperiness of the floor on the day of the accident.
ll1' determined the degree of slipperiness of the surface
of drfrndants floor by measuring the coefficient of friction between the plaintiff's shoe that she was wearing
at the time of the accident and the floor. His tests
werP made on a floor prepared by waxing it in the same
manrn•r and by the same procedure which Mr. James
H. Lee described in his deposition at Pages 38, 39 and
40. Since the injury occurred 4Yz months after waxing,
the test floor was aged by sprinkling dust on it, sweeping
it and polishing it some 95 times to duplicate the actual
eondition of the floor at the time of the accident (See
Affidavit of Douglas MacGregor, Paragraph 8; R. 25,
26) .
~fr.

.Mr. MacGregor is of the opm10n based upon his
knowledge and expertise, and upon the tests he conducted that the coefficient of friction was so low that
persons walking on it in a normal manner could easily
slip and fall. He was further of the opinion that any
time the coefficient of friction falls below 0.4, a slippPry condition exists and that people walking in a normal manner may slip and fall (See Affidavit of Douglas
MacGregor, Paragraph 11; R. 27, 28). It is noted from
Paragraph 9 (R. 27) of his Affidavit that the coefficient
of friction of the floor tested was 0.23 with the shoe sole
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and tht- floor both being dry. With the shoe sole being .
wet, and the floor dry, the coefficient of friction dropped .
to 0.18, which is considerably below the 0.4 standard. ·
The label on the wax can instructs that after waxing
a treatPd dust rnap shoitld b(', used to remove ordinary
dfrt (See Affidavit of Douglas :MacGregor, Paragraph
10; R. 27 and Affidavit of Hughes Brockbank, R. 34).
The failure of the defendants to nse a treated dust mop
coupled with the long period between the actual waxing
and the plaintiff's accident, created a dangerous situation
according to Mr. MacGregor. The dust mop or push
broom does not pick np the dust which is incorporated
into the wax surface by daily buffings. As a result the
coefficient of friction becomes much lower and the floor
hazardous (Affidavit of Douglas MacGregor, Paragraph
10; R. 27). This is demonstrated graphically in Exhibit
"A" attached to Mr. MacGregor's Affidavit (R. 29) which
shows the coefficient of friction at the time of the original waxing to be 0.85 and after daily buffings to be as
low as 0.15.

.
'

,

,

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE EXPERT EVIDENCE OF DOUGLAS MACGREGOR PRESENTS EVIDENCE THAT THE
FLOOR OF THE DEFENDANTS' RESTAURANT
WAS DANGEROUS AND UNSAFE AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.

Mr. Douglas MacGregor, a mechanical engineer, pre·
sented his opinion that the coefficient of friction of the .
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floor at the time of the accident was so low that persons
walking on the floor in a normal manner could easily
slip and fall (R. 27, 28). He further states that anytime
th<> coefficient of friction falls below 0.4 a slippery con<lition exists where people walking with normal care may
slip (R. 27, 28). According to his tests, the coefficient
of friction of the floor involved was considerably below
0.4.
There can be no question but that the Court should
consider tests and experiments performed by Mr. MacGrl'gor. Tests performed out of Court when they are
made under similar circumstances and like conditions
to those existing in the case at issue are admissible for
considnation by the trier of the facts. 29 Am. Jur. 2d,
E1 idrncr, Section 818. The purpose of permitting such
experiments is to aid the trier of the facts in determining
thP iss1ws in the case.
1

Expert testimony is admissible on the question
whether the floor is as a matter of fact dangerously
slippery. 63 A.L.R. 602. Coefficient of friction tests are
the universally accepted factor for determining scientifically the degree of slipperiness of a surface (See
Affidavit of Douglas MacGregor, Paragraph 6; R. 25).
This test measures the ease with which one surface will
move in relation to another surface. For example, if
thf' surface is ice it would take much less force to move
a shoe across the surface and hence the coefficient of
friction is far less than it would be on a more abrasive
l'llrface. If the coefficient of friction of a floor where
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large gronps of 1wople are required to walk is suffi. ,
cirntl>· low, the probabilities of people slipping becomes
high and a hazardous condition exists. Consequently,
thP tPsts of Mr. MacGregor have considerable probative
valn<' as to wlwther an unsafe condition existed. at the
time of thr accident.
This sci en ti fie evidence shows that the floor was
unsafe, which raises a fact issue to be determined by a
JUry.
POINT II.
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DEFENDANTS
MAINTAINED THE FLOOR OF THEIR PREMISES
RAISES A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT FOR DETERMINATION BY THE JURY.

One major area \v·here the defendants neglected their
duty was their failure to follow the instruction on the
wax can n~garding day-to-day cleaning of the waxed
floor.
'The wax can label directs that a treated dust mop
be used in order to pick up the dust from the floor prior
to buffing.
Mr. Lee testified in his deposition that the daily
maintenance of the floor consisted of going over the floor
with a dry dust mop or push broom, and then buffing
it with an rlectrieal buffing machine. Mr. MacGregor
points out that the dry dust mop or pnsh broom does
not pick np tJw dust on the floor; and as a result, the
dust is buffrd into tlw waxed surface. This alters the
wax0d surfacP reducing the coefficient of friction. Ac-
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r·ording to Mr. MacGn·gor the wax used was of such a

qualit:-· that when it \Vas first applied the coefficient of
friction was abov(• 0.4 which is considered safe for people
to walk upon. Exhibit "A" attached to Mr. MacGregor's
Affidavit (R. 29) dt>monstrates graphically how the surface of the floor becomes more slippery by daily buffing
accumulating dust into the waxed floor surface. About
50 days after the waxing, the coefficient of friction falls
below 0.4. In this case the defendants had not waxed
thP floor for about 4% months or about 130 days. In
Exhihit ''A" after buffing the floor daily for 95 times
tlw eoeffieient of friction goes as low as 0.15.
the defendants were negligent in not waxing their floors more frequently and in failing to follow
instructions on the label of the wax can for cleaning is
an issuP of fact that cannot be determined as a matter
of law.
~Whether

POINT III.
THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT
HAVE A WIPE-UP MAT OR ANY OTHER FLOOR
COVERING ON THE FLOOR AT THE TIME OF
THE ACCIDENT RAISES A TRIABLE ISSUE OF
FACT TO BE DETERMINED BY A JURY.
'l'hP defendants operate a business catering to a

gn·at rnltrntP of people. Their business is located in the
crnt(T of the Salt Lake City business district. Although
1lw <·vidPnce at this stage does not bring out the total
ltLHnbt•r of people that would patronize their business in
the f•onnw of a month, or even a day, the munber would
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be considerable since Mr. Lamb stated that over 200 ·
people patronized his restaurant in one morning (Depo.
sition of Mr. Lamb, Page 21, Line 21).
It is clear that at the fame of the accident and for
most of the morning prior to the accident, it was raining
and sleeting outside and the streets and pavement werf' ,
wet. As the plain6ff walked to Lamb's Grill her feet
became wet from the wet sid(~walk (See Affidavit of
Olive Preston). She walked from the wet pavement onto
the waxed floor. Everyone has had the experience of '
stepping on a waxed floor with wet feet and recognizes ·
the hazard involved. Here, we have a business which
patronizes to over 200 people in one morning, yet the
defendants took no precaution as to the safety of the
people entering or leaving their premises with regard
to their floor.
It is recognized that failure to provide mats or other
abrasive covering has been viewed as negligence. Erick·
son v. Walgre<>.11 Drug Cornpany, 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d
210, 213 (1951); Pegnatelli v. Gi'-mble Bros., 285 App. Div. '
625, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 23 (1955); Wakefidd v. Levin, 118 Vt.'
394, 110 A.2d 712 ( 1955). Obviously, it would be improper
to wax and polish an outside terazzo or tile floor sincr
rain or snow would make it extremely hazardous. Is it .
not equally as hazardous to maintain a waxed and pol·,
ished floor for people who have wet feet to walk upon
when thev enh~r. Wipe-up mats or other floor covering
are certainly a wise solution to the problem and failurr
to provide them creates a qn08tion of fact as to whether·
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or not the defendants exercised that degree of care which
n'asonable persons would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances.
POINT IV.
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS EVIDENCE FOUND
IN THE DEPOSITIONS, PLEADINGS, AND AFFIDAVITS ON FILE WHICH CREATES TRIABLE
ISSUES OF FACT.

f n this case the plainbff is a business invitee and

the deft>ndants owe her the duty to exercise reasonable
care to keep their premises reasonably safe for such
invitees. De TTl eese v. J. C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116,
297 P.'.2d 898 (1956); Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co.,
supra. Moreover, the owners of a business have the duty
to search out and discover concealed defects. Erickson
v. Wal,f}reen Drug Co., supra.
The defendants rely upon the case of Gaddis v.
LadiPs Literary Club, 4 Utah 2d 121, 288 P.2d 785 (1955),
which is distinguished from the case at hand. In the
Gaddis case, an order granting a motion to dismiss made
at the close of the plaintiff's evidence was upheld by
this 8ourt. It was upheld because the only evidence producPd at trial was that the plaintiff fell on a waxed floor.
Then~ was no showing in support of an allegation in the
complaint that the wax was applied "in a reckless mannPr," or "in an extreme quantity," or that is was "of an
inferior quality." Neither was there any evidence offered
by Gaddis that the floor was of such a composition which
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wonld render the application of wax dangerons or that
the composition of "the wax" was such as to create a
danger in its nse. Had there been such a showing there
would have hren evidence from which a jury could infer
negligence and the dismissal would have been reversed.
The following rule was stated:
'" . . . som<> condition beyond the fact that the
floor \Yas waxed and that the plaintiff fell is
n<'e<Jssar~· to a cause of action for negligence in
cr1c•ating or permitting a dangerous condition to
exist where people are expected to walk. The
proof did not meet this test. .. "
In this case we have: (1) a highly polished floor,
(2) defendants failing to follow waxing instruction, (3)
use of a non-treated dust mop, ( 4) wax on for over 41/z
months which causes it to lose its abrasive qualities, and
( 5) scientific proof of an unsafe condition.
Tlw courts consistently uphold verdicts where there
1s evidence, t~Yen if it is slight, in addition to the fact
that the plaintiff slipped on a waxed floor. For example,
in the case of "Wilson v. Payne, 74 Nev. 312, 330 P.2d 102
(1958), the> Nevada court held that waxing a floor was
negligent when people were required to ·walk on the wax
in their stocking feet. The case involved a situation
where the dt>fendant owned a beauty salon and people
frpquently walked on the floor in their stocking feet.
In anotht•r casP, the mere fact that the floor slanted and
was slipper~' "~as sufficiPnt to uphold a verdict for the
plaintiff. Kf'r11s r. F. Tl'. TVoolworth Co., 138 Mont. 249,
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:356 P.2d 127 (1960). In a Washington Supreme Court
case it was held that where there was evidence for the
plaintiff showing a skid mark on the floor in the wax
and waxing compound on the plaintiff's shoes, a jury
question was raised. Miller v. Payless Driig Store, Inc.,
Gl Wash. 2d 651, 379 P.2d 932 (1963). See also Clayton
L'. .!. C. Penmey Co., 8 Cal. Rep. 712 (1960). In the case
of Ed-wards v. Ross, 72 N.M. 38, 380 P.2d 188 (1963),
there was evidence that the wax on the floor could not
have been removed entirely by the cleaning operation
and that the cleaning done might have stirred up old
wax and increased slipperiness of some spots of the
floor. This was held to be sufficient for a jury question
as to whether or not a hazardous condition existed.
The plaintiff is entitled to have all her evidence and
any and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom
viewed in a light most favorable to her. Thompson v.
Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 63 (1964); Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1,
354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960). The facts of her affidavits on
summary judgment must be accepted as true. Eagle Oil
& Refining Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264
(1942); Severini v. Massai, 140 C.A.2d 567, 295 P.2d 472
(1956).
In all cases the paramount objective of the courts is
to render justice between the parties. Dismissal on Summary Judgment is a drastic action and is not favored.
For this reason the courts should be reluctant to invoke
the remedy since it prevents the opportunity from fully
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presenting the case to the court. Brandt v. Springville
Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960).
The rule is that if from the affidavits there is sufficient uncertainty that reasonable minds might differ
as to the conclusions that the summary judgment should
be reversed. Robinson v. Robinson, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394
P.2d 876 (1964). Moreover, if there is doubt the case
should be resolved in favor of safeguarding the right
to a jury trial. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., supra.
There is ample evidence that the defendants failed
to exercise reasonable care and that the floor was unsafe.
Particularly, since plaintiff's evidence must be viewed
in a light most favorable to her.

CONCLUSION
Viewing the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions
most favorable to the plaintiff, the following facts must
be assumed to be true:
1. That the floor was highly polished;
2. That the coefficient of friction was considerably
below a safe standard and the floor was unsafe and hazardous to people walking upon it in a normal manner;
3. That the defendants failed to follow waxing instructions;
4. That the defendants used a non-treated dust mop;

1
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5. rrhat the delay in re-waxing the floor for a period
of 4% months caused the floor to lose its abrasive qualities;
G. That the defendants failed to put out wipe-up
mats or other floor covering for the protection of people
walking upon their floor with wet feet.
The plaintiff-appellant respectfully submits that
these raise material issues of fact as to whether the
defendants were negligent and that the summary judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
MABEY, BRADFORD &
MARSDEN

By-·-·-------------------------------------------J. Fred Wright
1700 University Club Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

